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Paul Schreyer: Neue Erkenntnisse zur Luftabwehr 10 Jul 2011 19:35 #2032

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In seinem neuen Buch "Inside 9/11 Fakten und Hintergründe zehn Jahre danach" nimmt Schreyer die Luftabwehr in die Mangel. Er findet Hinweise in freigegebenen Akten das die Luftabwehr in mehreren Fällen von einem einzigen Verantwortlichen sabotiert wurde.

Eine Zusammenfassung seiner Kritik an der offiziellen Story ist hier zu finden.

Zusätzlich hat Schreyer ein Video bei youtuber veröffentlicht:



Eine kritische Diskussion ist auch bei 911blogger zu finden.

Mehr zu Paul Schreyer bei 911-archiv.net:

Interview mit Inside 9/11 Autor Paul Schreyer
Rezension zu Inside 9/11- Neue-Fakten und Hintergrunde zehn Jahre danach
Ein ernüchternder Gedanke, daß man zur Strafverfolgung eines Ladendiebs bessere Beweise braucht als dazu, einen Weltkrieg anzufangen. Anthony Scrivener
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Aw: Paul Schreyer: Neue Erkenntnisse zur Luftabwehr 10 Jul 2011 22:38 #2033

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Paul Schreyer antwortet auf Entgegnung des 9/11 CR-Staff-Members Miles Kara

On July 7th, 2011 Miles Kara, researcher and former staff member of the 9/11 Commission, wrote a response to my film "Inside 9/11 - Hijacking the air defense":

www.oredigger61.org/?page_id=2409

Here is my answer to him - as an open letter.

Dear Miles Kara,

a reader pointed me to your response on my film "Inside 9/11 - Hijacking the air defense". First I want to thank you for taking the time for a closer look on this. I put this as an open letter, going out to several other researchers as well. My principal aim is to promote an open discussion about this issue and your response is a very welcome step in this process.

The difficulty: My film is a very short summary of an 50-page essay, published two weeks ago in my German book "Inside 9/11 - Neue Fakten und Hintergründe zehn Jahre danach" ("Inside 9/11 - New facts and backgrounds ten years after"). I´m really looking for an American or UK publisher, so that my quite detailed research can be fully understood also by English speaking people. The film is more of a trailer in this respect. The arguments go deeper. But nonetheless the most important sources for each single claim are already mentioned in the film, as you surely may have noticed.

Knowing these limitations - here are my remarks on your response in short words.

1. Otis Scramble

My point: the 3-4 minutes delay from around 8:42 till 8:46 is unexplained

Official position: Marr supposedly had to ask General Arnold before he could scramble

Opposite argument: Colin Scoggins, Military Liaison at FAA Boston Center on 9/11, says that´s not true - the call was unnecessary because Marr had the authority to scramble jets on his own

Any comment on this from your side? Because in your remarks you didn´t even mention my point - the issue of the necessity of Marr´s call to Arnold.

2. Langley Scramble

My point: Nasypany wanted to scramble at 9:09, Marr resisted. But the reasons Marr gave for his resistance are appearantly inconsistent.

Official position: outlined in Marr´s interview with the 9/11 Commission, date 23.01.04, as well as in Lynn Spencer´s "Touching History", p. 112. I´m citing here the facts based on these sources from my book "Inside 9/11" (pp. 55-62):

Marr said he resisted the Langley scramble at 9:09 for two reasons: (a) he wanted to avoid that the Otis and the Langley jets ran out of fuel at the same time - leaving the air defense with no usable assets and (b) he didn´t want to have all fighters in one place - because according to Marr the Langley jets were also to fly to New York.

Opposite argument: (a) At 9:09 the Otis jets were already about 16-17 minutes airborne. How should they run out of fuel at the same time as the Langley jets airborne not earlyer than 10 to 15 minutes past 9:09 - in total taking off about half an hour past the Otis jets? (b) Nasypany said something different. According to him the Langley jets were not to fly to New York but to the Baltimore region right from the beginning - as he said to place a "barrier cap" north of Washington. (Interview 9/11 Commission with Nasypany, date 22./23.01.04) That means the Otis and the Langley jets weren´t at all to be in the same place.

Therefore in my opinion Marr´s account is inconsistent and no sufficient explanation is given so far for the delay in scambling the Langley jets.

3. Captain Borgstrom - Langley Supervisor of Flying

My point: Borgstrom was appearantly send away by NEADS leadership, with NEADS personnell in the "Operations Floor" not knowing about it - to the effect that communication with the Langley jets broke down

Official reason: not been given, issue not discussed officially so far
You say the call came not from Marr, but from Major Anderson. Furthermore the whole issue wouldn´t matter at all.

Opposite argument: If I get it right (please correct me if not), than Anderson sat in the NEADS "Operations Floor" right behind Sergeant Jeremy Powell. But according to Lynn Spencer´s account ("Touching History", p. 148) Powell didn´t know anything of this call. As he phoned Langley to give instructions to the airborne pilots he learned to his big surprise that the Supervisor of Flying Captain Borgstrom had been ordered to take off as a third pilot. How should that be, if Powell and Anderson sat right next to each other? Furthermore: Spencer indicates, that the call came clearly from Marr´s "Battle Cab". ("Touching History", p. 148)

More important: why sending a third pilot at all? What should have been the benefit of this? It´s obvious that in the end this decision led to communication breakdown with the Langley pilots.

All you do is citing the 9/11 Commission Report on this, which explains next to nothing regarding the question of Borgstrom.

4. Shootdown Order

My point: Colonel Marr didn´t convey Cheney´s Shootdown Order to the pilots

Official reason: not been given, issue not discussed officially so far

Although this has been put into question already by more prominent people than me: (a) John Farmer, leader of the 9/11 Commission´s Team 8, for whom you worked and who asks noteworthy questions about Marr´s behaviour regarding this in his book "The Ground Truth", p. 261. (b) Timothy Roemer of the 9/11 Commission (12th Public Hearing, Transcript, pp. 61-62)

Basically you say, the issue would´t matter because at the time the order was given the attacks were already over. But the crucial question is indeed: when was the order actually given?

Cheney´s position on this: he reached the bunker at 9:58, giving the order only after the crash of Flight 93. But there´s strong evidence against this. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta witnessed Cheney was in the bunker even before 9:20 - some 40 minutes earlyer as stated by the Vice President. Mineta´s recollection on this is corroborated precisely by radar data of Flight 77. (National Transportation Safety Board, 19.02.02, „Flight Path Study - American Airlines Flight 77“)

It appears that the exact timing of Cheney´s Shootdown Order is in great dispute. Evidence suggests, the order might have been given much earlier than officially stated.

That´s why Marr´s decision not to convey the order would possibly also have been made much earlier. I think this dispute about Cheney alone would require a new public investigation of 9/11 - because of its significance which one can hardly overestimate. And I think you possibly know this.

5. Syracuse fighters

On this I could possibly go along with your judgement - at least in some respect. But context does matter too. And as you see, I think to have found one man delaying and obstructing over and over again. And the case of Syracuse simply fits into this pattern - even though it might really not be that important as the first four examples.

Summation

You summarize my film: "His thesis and argument are false and do not provide the support he intended." Sorry, but that same judgement one could also give about your argument which doesn´t convince at all.

What I really don´t understand: Why are you against a new public investigation? I think everybody could win with it. If the serious charges by some critics, such as mine, where really investigated in a transparent way ... who knows ... in the end it might emerge they´re all wrong ... Couldn´t it be? What would reasonable people like you loose with this?

Best regards,

Paul Schreyer

911blogger.com/news/2011-07-10/response-...911-air-defense-film
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Aw: Paul Schreyer: Neue Erkenntnisse zur Luftabwehr 11 Jul 2011 06:19 #2034

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Punkt 1
Die militärische Reaktion auf eine Entführung musste über das Pentagon und dem Entführungs-Koordinator des FAA laufen. Dass Marr sich die Genehmigung von seinem Vorgesetzten, General Arnold, holte, könnte also verständlich sein. Laut Schreyers Buch, war jedoch dieser Anruf von Marr nicht notwendig. Seine Fussnote geht zum Buch des Militärhistorikers Herrn Filson. Ich habe dessen Buch nicht, jedoch wird Filson in der 911-Datenbank "history commens" konträr zu Schreyer zitiert. Verteidigungsminister Rumsfeld hätte den Einsatz genehmigen müssen, tat er jedoch nicht.

"The 1st Air Force’s official history of the response to the 9/11 attacks will later suggest that Boston Center is not following normal procedures when it makes this call to NEADS. It states: “If normal procedures had taken place… Powell (NEADS) probably wouldn’t have taken that phone call. Normally, the FAA would have contacted officials at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center who would have contacted the North American Aerospace Defense Command. The secretary of defense would have had to approve the use of military assets to assist in a hijacking, always considered a law enforcement issue.” The only explanation it gives for this departure from protocol is that “nothing was normal on Sept. 11, 2001, and many say the traditional chain of command went by the wayside to get the job done.”
Filson, 2003, pp. 51
(8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Notifies NEADS of Hijacking, against Normal Procedures; Accounts Conflict over Timing
www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=...oradnotified#a837nor...

point 2
Ich bin mir nicht sicher, dass man die Aussage von Major Nasypany derart interpretieren kann, wie es Schreyer macht. Wollte Nasypany wirklich die Abfangjäger um 09:09 starten lassen und in Richtung Baltimore schicken?
Nach meiner Übersetzung, wollte Nasypany die Abfangjäger lediglich startklar auf Gefechtsposition haben (battle station) um sie ggf. schnell aufschicken zu lassen in Richtung Baltimore, wenn eine neue Gefahr bestünde. Ich bin mir nicht sicher, ob ich richtig liege mit meiner Übersetzung.
www.scribd.com/doc/20965380/Mfr-Nara-t8-...-Nasypany-Kevin-J-12...

Punkt 3
I stimme mit Schreyer überein.

Punkt 4
es macht keinen Sinn, dass Cheney einen Abschussbefehl um 09:25 gab. Er wird seitens des "jungen Mannes" davon unterrichtet, wie weit entfernt das angreifende Flugzeug ist und dann kurz vor dem Angriff gefragt, ob die Befehle noch stehen. Dann wird das angreifende Flugzeug jedoch gerade nicht abgeschossen, sondern fliegt ungehindert ins Pentagon!

Es gibt viele Fragen zum Buch, das jedoch nichtsdestoweniger gut und hilfreich ist.
Last Edit: 11 Jul 2011 06:23 by bio1.
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