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Vorspiel Vorauswissen und Warnungen Insiderhandel
Vorspiel Vorauswissen und Warnungen Insiderhandel
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TOPIC: Insiderhandel
Insiderhandel 30 Jan 2009 19:56 #52
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Ein ernüchternder Gedanke, daß man zur Strafverfolgung eines Ladendiebs bessere Beweise braucht als dazu, einen Weltkrieg anzufangen. Anthony Scrivener
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Aw: Insiderhandel 29 Mar 2009 07:05 #66
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Die SEC hat niemals etwas veröffentlicht, im 9/11 Commission Report wird darauf aber eingegangen:
Soon after 911, rumors emerged that massive insider trading took place in the weeks prior to the attacks, as reported here: www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=...1/09/29/MN186128.DTL or in other sources. The national commission on terrorists attacks upon US, stated as following, page 147 f. No Evidence of Illicit Trading in the United States The U.S. government investigation unequivocally concluded that there was no evidence of illicit trading in the U.S. markets with knowledge of the terrorist attacks. The Commission staff, after an independent review of the government investigation, has discovered no reason to doubt this conclusion. To understand our finding, it is critical to understand the transparency of the U.S. markets. No one can make a securities trade in the U.S. markets without leaving a paper trail that the SEC can easily access through its regulatory powers. Moreover, brokerdealers must maintain certain basic information on their customers. It is, of course, entirely possible to trade through an offshore company, or a series of nominee accounts and shell companies, a strategy that can make the beneficial owner hard to determine. Still, the investigators could always detect the initial trade, even if they could not determine the beneficial owner. Any suspicious profitable trading through such accounts would be starkly visible. The investigators of the 9/11 trades never found any blind alleys caused by shell companies, offshore accounts, or anything else; they were able to investigate the suspicious trades they identified. Every suspicious trade was determined to be part of a legitimate trading strategy totally unrelated to the terrorist attacks. Many of the public reports concerning insider trading before 9/11 focused on the two airline companies most directly involved: UAL Corp., the parent company of United Airlines, and AMR Corp., the parent company of American Airlines. Specifically, many people have correctly pointed out that unusually high volumes of put options traded in UAL on September 6–7 and in AMR on September 10.169 When the markets opened on September 17, AMR fell 40 percent and UAL fell 43 percent. The suspicious options trading before the attacks fueled speculation that al Qaeda had taken advantage of the U.S. markets to make massive profits from its murderous attacks. The allegations had appeal on their face—just as al Qaeda used our sophisticated transportation system to attack us, it appeared to have used our sophisticated markets to finance itself and provide money for more attacks. But we conclude that this scenario simply did not happen. Although this report will not discuss each of the trades that profited from the 9/11 attacks, some of the larger trades, particularly those cited in the media as troubling, are illustrative and typical both of the nature of the government investigation into the trades and of the innocent nature of the trading. The put trading in AMR and UAL is a case in point: it appeared that somebody made big money by betting UAL and AMR stock prices were going to collapse, yet closer inspection revealed that the transactions were part of an innocuous trading strategy. The UAL trading on September 6 is a good example. On that day alone, the UAL put option volume was much higher than any surrounding day and exceeded the call option volume by more than 20 times—highly suspicious numbers on their face. The SEC quickly discovered, however, that a single U.S. investment adviser had purchased 95 percent of the UAL put option volume for the day. The investment adviser certainly did not fit the profile of an al Qaeda operative: it was based in the United States, registered with the SEC, and managed several hedge funds with $5.3 billion under management. In interviews by the SEC, both the CEO of the adviser and the trader who executed the trade explained that they—and not any client—made the decision to buy the put as part of a trading strategy based on a bearish view of the airline industry. They held bearish views for a number of reasons, including recently released on-time departure figures, which suggested the airlines were carrying fewer passengers, and recently disclosed news by AMR reflecting poor business fundamentals. In pursuit of this strategy, the adviser sold short a number of airline shares between September 6 and September 10; its transactions included the fortunate purchase of UAL puts. The adviser, however, also bought 115,000 shares of AMR on September 10, believing that their price already reflected the recently released financial information and would not fall any further. Those shares dropped significantly when the markets reopened after the attacks. Looking at the totality of the adviser’s circumstances, as opposed to just the purchase of the puts, convinced the SEC that it had absolutely nothing to do with the attacks or al Qaeda. Still, the SEC referred the trade to the FBI, which also conducted its own investigation and reached the same conclusion. The AMR put trading on September 10 further reveals how trading that looks highly suspicious at first blush can prove innocuous. The put volume of AMR on September 10 was unusually high and actually exceeded the call volume by a ratio of 6:1—again, highly suspicious on its face. The SEC traced much of the surge in volume to a California investment advice newsletter, distributed by email and fax on Sunday, September 9, which advised its subscribers to purchase a particular type of AMR put options. The SEC interviewed 28 individuals who purchased these types of AMR puts on September 10, and found that 26 of them cited the newsletter as the reason for their transaction. Another 27 purchasers were listed as subscribers of the newsletter. The SEC interviewed the author of the newsletter, a U.S. citizen, who explained his investment strategy analysis, which had nothing to do with foreknowledge of 9/11. Other put option volume on September 10 was traced to similarly innocuous trades. Another good example concerns a suspicious UAL put trade on September 7, 2001. A single trader bought more than one-third of the total puts purchased that day, establishing a position that proved very profitable after 9/11. Moreover, it turns out that the same trader had a short position in UAL calls—another strategy that would pay off if the price of UAL dropped. Investigation, however, identified the purchaser as a well-established New York hedge fund with $2 billion under management. Setting aside the unlikelihood of al Qaeda having a relationship with a major New York hedge fund, these trades looked facially suspicious. But further examination showed the fund also owned 29,000 shares of UAL stock at the time—all part of a complex, computer-driven trading strategy. As a result of these transactions, the fund actually lost $85,000 in value when the market reopened. Had the hedge fund wanted to profit from the attacks, it would not have retained the UAL shares. These examples were typical. The SEC and the FBI investigated all of the put option purchases in UAL and AMR, drawing on multiple and redundant sources of information to ensure complete coverage. All profitable option trading was investigated and resolved. There was no evidence of illicit trading and no unexplained or mysterious trading. Moreover, there was no evidence that profits from any profitable options trading went uncollected. The options trading in UAL and AMR was typical of the entire investigation. In all sectors and companies whose trades looked suspicious because of their timing and profitability, including short selling of UAL, AMR, and other airline stocks, close crutiny revealed absolutely no evidence of foreknowledge. The pattern is repeated over and over. For example, the FBI investigated a trader who bought a substantial position in put options in AIG Insurance Co. shortly before 9/11. Viewed in isolation, the trade looked highly suspicious, especially when AIG stock plummeted after 9/11. The FBI found that the trade had been made by a fund manager to hedge a long position of 4.2 million shares in the AIG common stock. The fund manager owned a significant amount of AIG stock, but the fund had a very low tax basis in the stock (that is, it had been bought long ago and had appreciated significantly over time). Selling even some of it would have created a massive tax liability. Thus, the fund manager chose to hedge his position through a put option purchase. After 9/11, the fund profited substantially from its investment in puts. At the same time, however, it suffered a substantial loss on the common stock, and overall lost money as a result of the attacks. In sum, the investigation found absolutely no evidence that any trading occurred with foreknowledge of 9/11. The transparency of the U.S. securities markets almost ensures that any such trading would be detectable by investigators. Even if the use of some combination of offshore accounts, shell companies, and false identification obscured the identity of the traders themselves, the unexplained trade would stand out like a giant red flag. The absence of any such flags corroborates the conclusion that there is no evidence any such trading occurred. Indeed, the leaders of both the SEC and FBI investigations into pre-9/11 trading expressed great confidence in this conclusion. *** So, what is the right conclusion? The highly suspicious trades turned out to be benign, by looking at the details. Besides all problems with the integrity of the commission report, I have no reason to doubt the conclusions. In fact, the hint to the transparancy of US stock market are correct. Everybody who wants to profit with the attacks must be aware of this tracking probablity. So it had to be crazy to lay direct traces to the insiders. But: What looks indeeed suspicious is the pure amount of coincidence of all stated examples. It was just a matter of random chance. One person with explainable reasons to buy stock options in one of the mostly affected 911 stocks may happen. But the same stuff in every 911 enlisted company? I say no chance for coincidence. What explanation could exist? Remember the time before 911. Stock markets were extremly weak the weeks prior to the attacks. So it is no great conclusion to assume that massive selling orders existed. By whom? I'm very sure that this was never examined, thanks to all efforts of Enlightenment of the financial background on strange stock market behavior was focussed on these put trading allegations, not in the overall behavior of all the market participants. Could it be, that the put options buyers were duped as the alleged hijacker-patsies? These questions remains: Who were the buyers of the put options concretely? Is there random chance for all this stuff to happen? Do they have conncetions to alleged insider circles on Wall St'? Who sold stocks prior to the attacks? Is it far fetched to assume, that the Buyers of the put options were duped by inner circles to create red herrings, while the real deceit was the massive selling of all stocks owned by an inner circle?  The Dow Jones fell from about 10500 points to close to about 9500 points in the weeks prior to the attack. This is enough for enormous distribution by insiders. Unfortunately I have no price chart weekly or daily of this time. But you can trust me. I was active in the stock market at this time. |
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Aw: Insiderhandel 15 Jul 2009 16:18 #153
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Aw: Insiderhandel Convar 03 Aug 2009 21:12 #205
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Ein ernüchternder Gedanke, daß man zur Strafverfolgung eines Ladendiebs bessere Beweise braucht als dazu, einen Weltkrieg anzufangen. Anthony Scrivener
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Re:Insiderhandel 21 Aug 2009 18:28 #267
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Ein ernüchternder Gedanke, daß man zur Strafverfolgung eines Ladendiebs bessere Beweise braucht als dazu, einen Weltkrieg anzufangen. Anthony Scrivener
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Aw: Insiderhandel 30 Nov 2009 17:33 #410
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Ein ernüchternder Gedanke, daß man zur Strafverfolgung eines Ladendiebs bessere Beweise braucht als dazu, einen Weltkrieg anzufangen. Anthony Scrivener
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